

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0375

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF
JULY 15, 1975

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0373

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION
WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF JULY 15, 1975. PARAGRAPHS
1 THROUGH 6, CONTAINING SUMMARY, TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

7. BELGIAN REP AS HOST GREETED THE PARTICIPANTS.
DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP,
HE SAID THAT, IN THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, PARTICI-
PANTS HAD CONTINUED THEIR INTERESTING DISCUSSION OF
FORCE DEFINITIONS. TODAY, WESTERN REPS SUGGESTED

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THAT PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSION OF THIS

TOPIC AND ALSO HAVE A MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF OTHER TOPICS IN CONFORMITY WITH THEIR AGREEMENT THAT THERE BE PARALLEL DISCUSSION.

BELGIAN REP SAID THAT EASTERN REPS HAD SUGGESTED THREE MAIN POINTS WHICH MIGHT BE ADOPTED AS GOALS OF A DEFINITION: COMPREHENSIVENESS, DIVISION INTO TWO FORCES; AND A GOAL WHICH COVERED THE EAST'S SUGGESTED WAY OF DEALING WITH SPECIFIC CASES WHICH EASTERN REPS FELT THE WEST HAD NOT CORRECTLY PLACED IN THE ALLIED DEFINITION.

8. BELGIAN REP SAID THAT, TURNING TO THE FIRST OF THESE POSSIBLE GOALS, WHAT WAS INVOLVED HERE WAS A REQUIREMENT THAT ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA BE INCLUDED, BUT ONLY THESE PERSONNEL. RESERVISTS, CIVILIANS OR MEMBERS OF OTHER UNIFORMED ORGANIZATIONS EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. THESE EXCLUSIONS MUST BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN ANY AGREED GOAL COVERING COMPREHENSIVENESS. THIS WAS NOT A MERE DETAIL. TO TURN TO ANOTHER ASPECT, BELGIAN REP NOTED THAT HE HAD MENTIONED PERSONNEL AND NOT ARMAMENTS. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT MOST MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA WERE ORGANIZED IN UNITS AND THAT THOSE UNITS HAD ARMAMENTS OR EQUIPMENT. BUT A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, SUCH AS THOSE IN DEFENSE MINISTRIES AND HEADQUARTERS, WERE NOT IN UNITS. A DEFINITION IN TERMS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL THEREFORE COVERED ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THOSE IN ALL THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF UNITS IN THE AREA, WHATEVER ARMAMENTS OR EQUIPMENT THEY MIGHT HAVE. ANY DEFINITION WOULD OF COURSE BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE VIEWS OF EITHER SIDE ON REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.

9. BELGIAN REP STATED THAT, WITH THESE POINTS IN MIND, THE WEST HAD DEVELOPED A POSSIBLE FORMULATION OF THE EAST'S FIRST TWO GOALS, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WESTERN VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR AN EARLY EXCHANGE OF DATA. IT WAS AS FOLLOWS:

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FOR THE PURPOSES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE AN AGREED DEFINITION WHICH SHOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE REDUCTION PROGRAMS OF EITHER SIDE. THE GOALS OF THIS DEFINITION SHOULD BE:

FIRST, TO ASSURE THAT ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE UNIFORMED ARMED FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS ARE COVERED BY

THE DEFINITION AND THAT ONLY SUCH PERSONNEL ARE COVERED. THIS EXCLUDES RESERVISTS, CIVILIANS AND THE PERSONNEL OF OTHER UNIFORMED ORGANIZATIONS EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS.

SECOND, TO ALLOCATE ALL THESE MILITARY PERSONNEL BETWEEN AIR FORCES AND GROUND FORCES. AGREEMENT ON THIS GOAL IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE METHOD OF ACHIEVING IT.

10. BELGIAN REP SAID THAT, AS REGARDS THE EAST'S PROPOSED THIRD GOAL, THAT FORCES WITH A SIMILAR FUNCTION SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE SAME CATEGORY, EITHER GROUND FORCES OR AIR FORCES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR UNIFORM, ALLIED REPS WOULD HAVE TO GIVE FURTHER STUDY TO THIS CONCEPT AND ALL ITS IMPLICATIONS.

11. KHESTOV SAID THAT, AS BELGIAN REP HAD STRESSED, EASTERN REPS ALSO FULLY AGREED THAT AT THE PRESENT CONCLUDING INFORMAL SESSION OF THE PRESENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONTINUE THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF DEFINITIONS ON THE ONE HAND, AND ALSO OF OTHER ISSUES REGARDING MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ON THE OTHER HAND.

12. KHESTOV SAID HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO NOTE THAT, DURING THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD EMPHASIZED THE FACT THAT THEIR DEFINITION WAS COMPREHENSIVE. ALTHOUGH EASTERN REPS HAD MADE THIS POINT CLEAR IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION, THEY COULD STATE ONCE AGAIN THAT THEIR DEFINITION COVERED ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND ALL FORCES WHICH FORMED PART OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. DURING THE LAST SESSION, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE DEFINITION PROPOSED BY THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY, TO DEFINE
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FORCES AS BELONGING TO GROUND FORCES OR TO AIR FORCES BASED ON THE CRITERION OF MILITARY UNIFORM, WAS IMPOSSIBLE IN PRACTICE. EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO POINTED TO A NUMBER OF OTHER ESSENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS IN THE WESTERN DEFINITION WHICH RENDERED IT LESS CLEAR AND COMPREHENSIVE THAN THE DEFINITION PROPOSED BY EASTERN REPS. THE DISCUSSION DURING THE LAST SESSION HAD HELPED TO MOVE PARTICIPANTS TOWARDS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON SOME ELEMENTS CONNECTED WITH THE WORKING OUT OF AN AGREED DEFINITION. THIS HAD HAD POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A DEFINITION.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0375

FROM US REP MBFR

13. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, DURING THE LAST SESSION, PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN ABLE TO FIND SOME COMMON APPROACHES ALTHOUGH WITH SOME RESERVATIONS. EXAMPLES OF THESE COMMON APPROACHES HAD BEEN FIRST, THAT AN AGREED DEFINITION SHOULD COVER ALL FORCES AND, CONSEQUENTLY, ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL FORMING THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE SECOND CONSIDERATION HAD BEEN THAT AN AGREED DEFINITION SHOULD CLEARLY INDICATE WHICH OF THESE FORCES SHOULD BELONG TO GROUND FORCES AND WHICH TO AIR FORCES. THE THIRD POINT WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE LAST SESSION WAS THAT, FOR THE PURPOSES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WAS A NEED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE CATEGORIZATION OF SIMILAR FORCES, FORCES OF THE SAME TYPE, AS BELONGING ON BOTH SIDES TO ONE AND THE SAME ARMED SERVICE, THAT IS, EITHER TO GROUND FORCES OR TO AIR FORCES.

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14. KHESTOV SAID THE STATEMENT JUST MADE BY THE BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE SHOWED THAT, ON THE THIRD ELEMENT, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES COULD NOT PRESENT A POSITION. IT APPEARED TO EASTERN REPS THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH AND THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES WHICH EASTERN REPS HAD SUGGESTED WAS OBJECTIVE AND FAIR. HE THEREFORE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT PREVENTED THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES FROM AGREEING TO IT. THE BELGIAN REP'S ARGUMENTATION THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE WESTERN SIDE TO STUDY THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EASTERN APPROACH ON THE THIRD POINT COULD AND MUST BE APPLIED TO ANY QUESTION PARTICIPANTS WERE DISCUSSING, NAMELY, ALSO TO THE FIRST AND SECOND POINTS. THEREFORE, IF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES AS SET FORTH BY THE BELGIAN REP WAS THAT THE WESTERN SIDE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO FORMULATE ITS ATTITUDE ON THE THIRD QUESTION, THEN IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ELABORATE ANY FORMULATION COVERING ONLY THE FIRST TWO OF THE THREE ELEMENTS. THIS WAS BECAUSE IT WAS QUITE NATURAL THAT ALL OF THESE THREE ELEMENTS WERE CLOSELY INTERRELATED.

15. KHESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO USE THIS OCCASION TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS ON THE DEFINITION WHICH THE EASTERN REPS HAD PUT FORWARD. EASTERN REPS HAD CLOSELY ANALYZED THE REMARKS MADE BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ABOUT THIS DEFINITION AS WELL AS THE QUESTIONS WESTERN REPS HAD ASKED IN CONNECTION WITH IT. THE ESSENCE OF ALMOST ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS WAS A WESTERN DOUBT AS TO WHETHER THIS DEFINITION COVERED ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WITH, OF COURSE, THE EXCEPTION OF THE NAVY. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY SAID ORALLY THAT THEIR DEFINITION WAS AIMED TO COVER ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL FORMING THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY WESTERN REPS, EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO INCLUDE IN THE EASTERN DEFINITION AN APPROPRIATE ADDITION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFINITION COVERED ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL, ALL FORCES FORMING THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS WERE ALSO PREPARED TO INCLUDE IN THE DEFINITION THEY HAD PROPOSED LANGUAGE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE DEFINITION ALSO COVERED ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS SO THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD HAVE COMPLETE CLARITY ON THIS MATTER SINCE WESTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT IT.

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16. KHESTOV SAID THAT, AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT FROM THE STATEMENTS MADE BY WESTERN REPS, SUCH ADDITIONS WOULD REMOVE WESTERN DOUBTS CONCERNING THE COVERAGE OF ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL FORMING PART OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING COVERAGE OF THOSE MILITARY PERSONNEL TO WHOM BELGIAN REP HAD REFERRED IN HIS OPENING REMARKS,

NOTABLY THE PERSONNEL OF DEFENSE MINISTRIES, HEADQUARTERS, TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS, AND MILITARY ACADEMIES.

17. KHESTOV SAID THAT, AS TO THE TERMS "FORCES" OR "ARMED FORCES" WHICH WERE CONTAINED IN THE EASTERN DEFINITION, EASTERN REPS THOUGHT THAT, IN WORKING OUT A DEFINITION WHOSE GOAL WOULD BE TO SHOW WHAT FORCES SHOULD BELONG TO THE GROUND FORCES AND WHAT FORCES TO THE AIR FORCES, IT WAS NATURAL THAT ONE SHOULD INDICATE IN THE DEFINITION WHERE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WOULD BELONG ALONGSIDE THE MILITARY PERSONNEL CONCERNED. OTHERWISE, ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WOULD BE LEFT OUTSIDE THE GROUND FORCES AND THE AIR FORCES, WHICH WOULD BE ILLOGICAL.

18. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT, THEREFORE, WHEN EASTERN REPS SAID IN THEIR DEFINITION CERTAIN FORCES, FOR EXAMPLE, MECHANIZED INFANTRY, SHOULD BELONG TO THE GROUND FORCES, IT WAS NATURAL THAT THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WHICH THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY HAD SHOULD, FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, ALSO BELONG TO THE APPROPRIATE ARMED SERVICE, THAT IS TO SAY, IN THIS CASE, TO THE GROUND FORCES.

19. KHESTOV SAID THAT EASTERN REPS FULLY AGREED WITH BELGIAN REP'S REMARKS THAT THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR EITHER SIDE. FOR THE PURPOSES OF WORKING OUT A DEFINITION, THIS ALLOCATION OF ARMAMENTS WOULD BE DONE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS ON ALL ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT AND ALSO THAT, AT THIS PARTICULAR

STAGE, A DEFINITION SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES ON THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THE INCLUSION OF FORMULATIONS OF THE KIND HE HAD DESCRIBED IN A DEFINITION WOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF ANY PARTICIPANT ON THE ENTIRE REDUCTION PROBLEM.

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20. US REP SAID HE WANTED TO ASK A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY. TURNING FIRST TO THE FIRST GOAL, THAT OF COMPREHENSIVENESS, KHESTOV'S FORMULATION STATED THAT THE DEFINITION SHOULD COVER ALL FORCES AND, CONSEQUENTLY, ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL FORMING THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. DID US REP UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY FROM KHESTOV'S USE OF THE TERM "MILITARY" THAT EASTERN REPS INTENDED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ALL CIVILIANS WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM A DEFINITION?

21. KHESTOV SAID HE WOULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION. AS WESTERN REPS REMEMBERED, DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS HAD UNFOLDED ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: WESTERN REPS HAD HAD CERTAIN

APPREHENSIONS AS TO WHETHER THE EASTERN DEFINITION COVERED
MILITARY PERSONNEL ORGANIZED IN UNITS AS WELL AS MILITARY
PERSONNEL NOT ORGANIZED IN UNITS, SUCH AS THE PERSONNEL OF
DEFENSE MINISTRIES, HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.

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FROM US REP MBFR

EASTERN REPS HAD EXPLAINED THAT, IN THEIR VIEW, ALL THESE
PERSONNEL WERE ORGANIZED IN UNITS. ACCORDING TO THE EASTERN
UNDERSTANDING OF THE MATTER, A HEADQUARTERS WAS ALSO A
UNIT, AS WAS A TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT. JUDGING FROM WESTERN
COMMENTS, WESTERN REPS HAD A DIFFERENT OPINION. ACCORDING TO
THE WESTERN INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "UNIT", THIS TERM APPARENTLY
DID NOT COVER MILITARY PERSONNEL IN DEFENSE MINISTRIES, HEAD-
QUARTERS, AND SO ON. THEREFORE, FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION WHICH
PARTICIPANTS HAD HAD ON THIS TOPIC, EASTERN REPS HAD FOUND
A FORMULATION TO SHOW THAT THEIR DEFINITION COVERED ALL
MILITARY PERSONNEL, INCLUDING THOSE PERSONNEL NOT ORGANIZED IN
UNITS. EASTERN REPS HAD DEFINED THESE FORCES AND HAD ALSO IN-

DICATED THAT THEIR DEFINITION COVERED ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL WHICH FORMED THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

22. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, THE COURSE OF
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THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR HAD PREVENTED PARTICIPANTS FROM FORMULATING A POSITION OR VIEW ON ALL THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GOALS OF A DEFINITION. IN THE EASTERN VIEW, ALL OF THESE THREE QUESTIONS WERE CLOSELY INTERRELATED. CONSEQUENTLY, BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN PARTICIPANTS NEEDED TO STUDY THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE NOT CLEAR AND TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION ON DEFINITIONS DURING THE NEXT ROUND.

23. US REP SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM KHLESTOV'S RESPONSE THAT THE LATTER WAS NOT IN A POSITION AT THIS TIME TO GIVE WESTERN REPS THE EASTERN POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF EXCLUDING CIVILIANS.

24. KHLESTOV SAID HE COULD REPEAT THE WORDS HE HAD JUST USED ON THIS POINT. US REP SAID, THAT IS TO SAY, THAT THE EAST WISHED TO STUDY THE ISSUE FURTHER. KHLESTOV SAID HE COULD REPEAT WHAT HE HAD SAID, BUT THAT THE POINT WAS THAT IT SEEMED NECESSARY FOR BOTH SIDES TO STUDY THE ELEMENTS WHICH WERE NOT CLEAR. SINCE THIS WAS THE CASE, DISCUSSION OF THE DEFINITIONS ISSUE SHOULD BE CONTINUED DURING THE NEXT ROUND.

25. US REP SAID THAT, STILL UNDER THE HEADING OF COMPREHENSIVENESS, HE WANTED TO TURN TO THE SECOND ISSUE, THAT OF RESERVISTS. EASTERN REPS HAD OMITTED FROM THEIR DEFINITION THE TERM "ACTIVE DUTY". WAS US REP RIGHT IN UNDERSTANDING FROM THIS OMISSION THAT EASTERN REPS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A DEFINITION INCLUDING ALL RESERVISTS ON BOTH SIDES?

26. KHLESTOV RESPONDED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THIS QUESTION TOO SHOULD BE FURTHER DISCUSSED. THIS WOULD PERMIT BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN REPS TO EXPRESS THEIR OWN VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION. IT NEEDED FURTHER DISCUSSION. THEREFORE, IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN THE NEXT ROUND.

27. US REP SAID HE ASSUMED THAT EASTERN REPS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS TOPIC OF RESERVISTS. KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS POINT. PERHAPS SOME "QUARLES-TYPE" IDEA WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BRING A RESOLUTION OF IT.

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28. US REP SAID THAT, STILL UNDER THE HEADING OF THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF A DEFINITION, HOW DID EASTERN REPS PROPOSE TO DEAL WITH OTHER UNIFORMED ORGANIZATIONS EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS? THIS QUESTION WAS SOMEWHAT INTERRELATED TO THAT OF THE RESERVISTS. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, SINCE US REP HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION, PARTICIPANTS COULD ALSO DISCUSS IT AT THE APPROPRIATE STAGE. ALL PARTICIPANTS PROCEEDED FROM THE IDEA THAT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THEY WERE DEALING WITH THE ARMED FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. OF COURSE, EASTERN REPS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS ANY QUESTION WHICH WESTERN REPS RAISED.

29. US REP SAID, TURNING NOW TO KHLESTOV'S SECOND SUGGESTED GOAL, THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CLEARLY INDICATE WHICH OF THESE MILITARY FORCES SHOULD BELONG TO THE AIR FORCES AND WHICH TO THE GROUND FORCES, WESTERN REPS WERE ALSO IN AGREEMENT WITH THIS OBJECTIVE, OF COURSE ON THE UNDERSTANDING, AS US REP BELIEVED KHLESTOV HIMSELF HAD POINTED OUT, THAT AGREEMENT ON THIS OBJECTIVE WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE METHOD OF ACHIEVING IT.

30. US REP SAID THAT, TURNING NOW TO THIS METHOD, KHLESTOV HAD SAID HE PROPOSED TO INCLUDE IN A DEFINITION APPROPRIATE ADDITIONS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE DEFINITION COVERED ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, US REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE EASTERN REPS DURING THE RECESS THE FACT THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH TO THE METHOD OF DEFINITION ENTAILED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. AS LONG AS THE EASTERN DEFINITION LACKED EXPLICIT WORDING WHICH MADE IT COMPREHENSIVE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ENUMERATE ALL OF THE TYPES OF FORCES IN THE AREA, HOWEVER MINOR. WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THE IMPRACTICALITY OF THIS ENUMERATIVE APPROACH. IN ADDITION, THIS METHOD WOULD NOT COVER NEW TYPES OF FORCES. BUT EVEN IF THE EASTERN DEFINITION WERE AMENDED TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE CLEARLY PROVIDING FOR COMPREHENSIVENESS, THE EAST WOULD STILL HAVE TO ENUMERATE ALL OF THE TYPES OF FORCES IN THE AREA IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES, WHICH WAS AN AGREED OBJECTIVE OF A DEFINITION, AND THE EASTERN METHOD WOULD STILL NOT COVER NEW TYPES OF FORCES IN THIS REGARD. TO GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF THE
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EASTERN APPROACH AS APPLIED TO DIVIDING FORCES BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES, IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO BOTH SIDES THAT THE EASTERN DEFINITION AS PRESENTLY FORMULATED COVERED PERSONNEL IN MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS. BUT IN

ANY EVENT, IF, AS IN THE CASE OF WESTERN MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO DEFENSE MINISTRIES, THESE PERSONNEL WERE NOT ORGANIZED IN UNITS, HOW WOULD THE EAST DIVIDE THIS PERSONNEL BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES USING THE EASTERN ENUMERATIVE METHOD? IT SEEMED TO WESTERN REPS THAT THE ONLY PRACTICAL APPROACH HERE WAS THAT OF UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA.

31. US REP SAID THAT, TURNING NOW TO KHLESTOV'S THIRD POINT, THE CATEGORIZATION OF SIMILAR FORCES ON BOTH SIDES TO BELONG TO THE SAME SERVICE, GROUND FORCES OR AIR FORCES,

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FROM US REP MBFR

WAS IT CORRECT TO ASSUME THAT, PROVIDED THAT SIMILAR FORCES ON BOTH SIDES WERE PUT IN THE SAME CATEGORY, ONE COULD PUT THESE FORCES IN EITHER CATEGORY, EITHER GROUND OR AIR, PROVIDED THAT THEY WERE ALL PUT IN THE SAME CATEGORY?

32. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION. FIRST, HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT THE CRITICISM THAT

DIVIDING FORCES ON THE BASIS OF THE SIMILARITY OF THEIR FUNCTION WOULD PRESENT DIFFICULTIES WAS IN THE EASTERN VIEW UNFOUNDED. ALL PARTICIPANTS KNEW WHAT THE TERM "SIMILAR IN THEIR TYPE" MEANT. NEITHER SIDE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAD ANY DOUBT ABOUT WHERE 95 PERCENT OF THE FORCES IN THE AREA SHOULD BELONG. IT WAS CLEAR THAT TANK FORCES, INFANTRY AND OTHER FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCES. THIS, IN FACT, HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE BY PARTICIPANTS WHEN THEY HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD BELONG

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TO GROUND FORCES AND WHICH TO AIR FORCES. THE WESTERN UNIFORM CRITERION, AS EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT SEVERAL TIMES, LED TO CONFUSION IN CATEGORIZING FORCES AS TO WHETHER THEY BELONGED EITHER TO GROUND OR AIR FORCES. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS HAD ADOPTED A PRACTICAL APPROACH SO THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS COULD IN PRACTICE HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF HOW THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE RESOLVED. SINCE WESTERN REPS HAD STATED THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE THEIR POSITION ON THIS QUESTION NOW, HE WISHED TO CALL ON WESTERN REPS TO GIVE THOUGHT TO THIS ISSUE DURING THE RECESS, SO THAT AFTER THE RECESS THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ADOPT THE EASTERN POSITION THAT SIMILAR FORCES SHOULD BE CATEGORIZED IN A SIMILAR WAY. EASTERN REPS HAD OBSERVED THAT SOME SIMILAR FORCES ON BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES. THEREFORE, THERE WAS A NEED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO INCLUDE THESE SIMILAR FORCES IN SIMILAR CATEGORIES ON BOTH SIDES.

33. KHESTOV SAID THAT AN EXAMPLE WAS THE MISSILE FORCES. ALL THESE FORCES WERE IN THE GROUND FORCES ON BOTH SIDES EXCEPT FOR THE FRG. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT, FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT WAS NECESSARY THAT THESE FRG MISSILE FORCES BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCES.

34. KHESTOV SAID THE NEXT EXAMPLE WAS ARMY AVIATION, HELICOPTERS AND SMALL AIRCRAFT CONNECTED WITH ARMY AVIATION. EASTERN REPS THOUGHT IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO INCLUDE THESE FORCES IN THE SAME CATEGORY ON BOTH SIDES, NAMELY IN THE GROUND FORCES.

35. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT, NEXT, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD FOUND A DISCREPANCY CONCERNING THE TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES FOUND IT NATURAL AND LOGICAL THAT THESE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AIR FORCES. ON THE WESTERN SIDE, THEY WERE ALREADY THERE, IN THE AIR FORCE.

36. KHESTOV SAID THAT, THUS, IN ANSWER TO US REP'S QUESTION,

HE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME LOGIC WHEN PARTICIPANTS TRIED TO SOLVE THE QUESTION OF WHERE SPECIFIC TYPES OF FORCES SHOULD BELONG.

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IT WOULD OF COURSE RUN COUNTER TO COMMON SENSE AND LOGIC IF FORCES WHICH CLEARLY BELONGED TO AIR FORCES WERE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCES. IT WAS THEREFORE NATURAL THAT THESE FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER THE AIR FORCES. EASTERN REPS ALSO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO COMMON SENSE AND LOGIC IF PARTICIPANTS PUT MISSILE FORCES CONNECTED WITH THE GROUND FORCES INTO THE AIR FORCES SINCE IT WAS EVIDENT THEY WERE CONNECTED WITH GROUND FORCES. THEREFORE IT WAS NECESSARY TO PUT ALL OF THE MISSILE FORCES IN THE SAME PLACE, UNDER THE GROUND FORCES.

37. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT, WITH RESPECT TO THE CANADIAN FORCES, PARTICIPANTS COULD FIND SOME WAY OF ALLOCATING THEM. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THOSE CANADIAN FORCES CONNECTED WITH AIR SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN AIR FORCES AND THAT THOSE CONNECTED WITH GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN GROUND FORCES. KHESTOV SAID HE HAD GIVEN THESE EXAMPLES JUST TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE WESTERN STATEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULTIES IN SETTling THIS DEFINITION ISSUE WAS NOT REALLY SO. THERE WOULD NOT BE SUCH GREAT DIFFICULTIES. IN 95 PERCENT OF THE CASES, THERE WERE NO DIFFICULTIES AT ALL. AND IT SHOULD BE READILY POSSIBLE TO FIND SOLUTIONS FOR THE REMAINING 5 PERCENT. SINCE, UNFORTUNATELY, PARTICIPANTS WERE RUNNING SHORT OF TIME ALLOCATED TO DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT, HE WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT IN THE VIEW OF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN USEFUL EVEN THOUGH IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING IT TO A CONCLUSION. THE DISCUSSION HAD ENABLED PARTICIPANTS TO GET A BETTER KNOWLEDGE OF BOTH SIDES' APPROACHES TO THIS QUESTION, A QUESTION WHICH COULD HAVE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE. THE DISCUSSION HAD PROVEN TO BE VERY HELPFUL IN BRINGING THE VIEWS OF THE PARTICIPANTS ON BOTH SIDES CLOSER. HE WISHED TO SUGGEST THAT DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC BE CLOSED AND THAT ANY REMAINING QUESTIONS BE DISCUSSED ON AN INFORMAL BASIS UNTIL THE NEXT ROUND.

38. FRG REP SAID HE DID HAVE ONE SPECIFIC QUESTION ON WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN ANSWER BEFORE DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC WAS CLOSED OFF. KHESTOV HAD MENTIONED THAT ALL HELICOPTER PERSONNEL SHOULD BELONG UNDER GROUND FORCES.

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BUT THERE WERE TWO KINDS OF HELICOPTERS IN THE AREA, THOSE SUPPORTING GROUND FORCES AND OTHERS WITH TRANSPORT FUNCTION. DID KHESTOV WISH TO INCLUDE ALL HELICOPTERS OF BOTH TYPES UNDER THE GROUND FORCES?

39. KHESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS WERE AWARE THAT THERE WERE VARIOUS TYPES OF HELICOPTERS IN THE AREA INCLUDING SUPPLY, TRANSPORT AND LIAISON HELICOPTERS. EASTERN REPS WERE PROPOSING THAT ALL TYPES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN GROUND FORCES. THAT IS TO SAY, ALL THOSE IN ARMY AVIATION UNITS. FRG REP SAID WHAT ABOUT HELICOPTERS IN THE AIR FORCE WITH AIR FORCE MISSIONS? AFTER CONSULTING WITH KAPITONOV, KHESTOV REPLIED THAT, AS FAR AS EASTERN REPS COULD JUDGE, ARMY AVIATION INCLUDED BOTH LEGALLY AND ORGANIZATIONALLY ALL HELICOPTER UNITS IN THE AREA. OF COURSE, THERE WERE A SMALL NUMBER OF AIR FORCE HELICOPTERS WHICH LEGALLY AND ORGANIZATIONALLY BELONG TO THE AIR FORCES. BUT THEIR NUMBER WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT. IT WAS THE EAST'S VIEW THAT THE SMALL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS WHICH LEGALLY AND ORGANIZATIONALLY FORMED PART OF THE AIR FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AIR FORCES. (COMMENT: KHESTOV GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE CONSIDERED THE NUMBER OF HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WITH AN AIR FORCE FUNCTION WAS SO SMALL THAT IT COULD BE ADJUSTED EITHER WAY.)

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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0375

FROM US REP MBFR

40. US REP , DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, SAID THAT WESTERN REPS AGREED THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD HAD AN INTERESTING AND WORTHWHILE DISCUSSION ON DEFINITIONS. WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH TO DEFINITIONS WAS IMPRACTICAL BECAUSE OF ITS USE OF THE ENUMERATIVE APPROACH, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE LISTING ALL TYPES OF FORCES IN ORDER TO BE TRULY COMPREHENSIVE. EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT WHAT THEY FOUND WRONG WITH THE WESTERN DEFINITION AS REGARDING ITS APPLICATION IN ALLOCATING FORCES BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND FORCES EASTERN REPS HAD INDICATED THAT, IN THEIR VIEW: (A) ALL POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCES; (B) THAT ALL HELICOPTER PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND FORCES; AND (C) THAT ALL TACTICAL MISSILE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO GROUND FORCES. HE ASSUMED THAT THE EAST MEANT ALL
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POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCES.

41. KHLESTOV SAID THAT WHAT THE EAST HAD IN MIND WAS THAT ALL TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCES. HE SAID HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT HE HAD JUST GIVEN EXAMPLES TO ILLUSTRATE THE SHORTCOMINGS WHICH THE EAST HAD SO FAR FOUND IN DISCUSSING THE WESTERN UNIFORM DEFINITION. HE DID NOT WISH TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT EASTERN REPS MIGHT IN DUE COURSE FIND SOME OTHER SPECIFIC ISSUES. THE PRESENT DISCUSSION WAS A PRELIMINARY ONE AND DID NOT MEAN THAT ALL POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED. US REP SAID THAT, NONETHELESS, AT THE MOMENT, THOSE MENTIONED WERE THE ONLY DIFFICULTIES THE EAST HAD IDENTIFIED THUS FAR. KHLESTOV SAID THIS WAS RIGHT, BUT WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS WAS THE RESULT ONLY OF A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE SITUATION.

42. US REP SAID THAT, DURING THE PRESENT SESSION, KHLESTOV HAD STATED SPECIFICALLY WHERE THESE FORCES SHOULD BE ASSIGNED. BUT IN THE LAST SESSION, HE HAD SAID THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO ASSIGN THE SAME TYPE OF FORCES TO THE SAME BASKET, BUT THAT THE BASKET SELECTED MIGHT BE EITHER ONE, AIR FORCES OR GROUND FORCES.

43. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, FROM WHAT HE HAD SAID ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT WHERE THE FORCES IN QUESTION SHOULD BELONG. IN ALLOCATING FORCES TO GROUND OR AIR, ONE SHOULD FOLLOW A CERTAIN LOGIC. ONE SHOULD NOT ACT CONTRARY TO COMMON SENSE. THE ONLY CHANGE EASTERN REPS COULD ENVISAGE, AS FAR AS THE QUESTIONS ALREADY TOUCHED ON WERE CONCERNED, WAS THAT THE

EAST COULD ENVISAGE CATEGORIZING ARMY AVIATION AS BELONGING TO THE AIR FORCE. BUT THIS WAS THE ONLY SUCH CASE.

44. US REP, DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, CONTINUED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THEY HAD MADE A CONSISTENT EFFORT TO APPLY THE UNIFORM CRITERION IN ALL CASES, BUT THAT, NEVERTHELESS, THE ALLIES WOULD EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EAST'S
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SUGGESTION. AS REGARDS THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE EASTERN SUGGESTION, AT FIRST SIGHT, THE EAST WOULD APPEAR TO WESTERN REPS TO BE ACCEPTING THE ILLUSTRATIVE SUGGESTION THE ALLIES HAD MADE LAST FALL REGARDING SOME HELICOPTER PERSONNEL AND POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND-BASED TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL. BUT, AS EASTERN REPS WERE AWARE, THE WESTERN SUGGESTION AT THAT TIME HAD BEEN DEPENDENT ON EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES AND ALSO THAT AGREEMENT ON THIS DEFINITION WOULD LEAD DIRECTLY TO AN EXCHANGE OF DATA. EASTERN REPS HAD NOT AGREED TO THESE REQUIREMENTS AT THAT TIME, NOR HAD THEY DONE SO NOW, SO THAT THE WEST HAD NOT PURSUED THE MATTER FURTHER.

45. US REP SAID THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV'S SUGGESTION, ALLIED REPS TOO HAD SUGGESTED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AT THIS POINT TRY TO FORMULATE THE COMMON GROUND WHICH WAS NOW APPARENTLY BETWEEN THEM ON THE FIRST TWO GOALS OF A DEFINITION, THE CONCEPTS OF COMPREHENSIVENESS AND OF DIVIDING ALL FORCES IN THE AREA INTO TWO FORCES, GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES. APPARENTLY, EASTERN REPS WERE NOT NOW READY TO FOLLOW THIS IDEA, BECAUSE THEY HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO STUDY THE FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISSUE OF COMPREHENSIVENESS. WESTERN REPS STILL HOPED EASTERN REPS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE FORWARD TO A COMMON DEFINITION EARLY IN THE NEXT ROUND.

46. US REP CONTINUED THAT WESTERN REPS WISHED IN ANY EVENT TO POINT OUT WHAT THEY HAD SAID FROM THE OUTSET OF THE JOINT DISCUSSION ON DEFINITIONS AND WHAT HAD BEEN

CONFIRMED BY THE DISCUSSION UP TO THIS TIME. THIS WAS
THAT THE DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE
IF IT WERE TAKING PLACE PARALLEL TO DISCUSSION OF DATA.
IN FACT, IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE AGREEMENT ON A
DEFINITION IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE DATA. IT WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT IF, TOGETHER WITH TABLING THE EAST'S TOTALS,
EASTERN REPS EXPLAINED THE BASIS ON WHICH THEY WERE
COMPUTED. IF THERE WERE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE TOTALS
AFTER THE EAST'S TOTALS HAD BEEN TABLED, THE TWO SIDES COULD
JOINTLY ANALYZE THE REASONS FOR THESE DIFFERENCES. BUT THERE
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WAS NO INTRINSIC NEED FOR PRIOR AGREEMENT ON DEFINITIONS IN
ORDER TO TABLE DATA. THE WEST HAD ALREADY TABLED ITS DATA
WITHOUT A JOINT DEFINITION. IN ANY EVENT, THE POSITIONS OF
BOTH SIDES WITH REGARD TO DEFINITIONS WERE NOW SUFFICIENTLY
CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE WHOLLY FEASIBLE TO EXCHANGE DATA.

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NRC-05 ACDE-00 /095 W
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P 171715Z JUL 75
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1145
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
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FROM US REP MBFR

47. POLISH REP SAID THAT, IF THE EAST PUT FORWARD DATA IN THE WAY JUST SUGGESTED BY THE US REP, WESTERN REPS WOULD NOT AGREE. US REP SAID HE WAS MERELY EXPLAINING HOW THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTIES FOR THE EAST TO PUT FORWARD ITS DATA WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON DEFINITIONS. HE WAS TAKING NO POSITION AS TO THE CONNOTATIONS OF ANY PARTICULAR WAY OF DOING SO.

48. KHLESTOV SAID PARTICIPANTS HAD THUS FAR FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE PROCEDURE PUT FORWARD BY THE BELGIAN REP AT THE OUTSET THAT DURING THE PRESENT SESSION PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE A PARALLEL DISCUSSION OF THE DEFINITION ISSUE BUT ALSO OF OTHER QUESTIONS. THEREFORE, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DDAW THE PROPER CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FUTURE AS REGARDS TREATMENT OF THESE TOPICS. SECOND, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF AGREEMENT ON THE
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DEFINITION ISSUE. BUT SO FAR, THE WESTERN REPS HAD NOT BEEN READY TO DISCUSS THE THIRD GOAL. THIS FACT MADE DISCUSSION OF THE DEFINITION AS A WHOLE DIFFICULT. SO IT WAS THEREFORE UP TO THE WESTERN REPS IF THERE WAS TO BE A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF ALL THREE GOALS, AND HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN THIS FOLLOWING THE NEXT ROUND. THIRD, THE EASTERN POSITION ON QUESTIONS OF DATA WAS VERY WELL KNOWN TO WESTERN REPS AND IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO RESTATE IT. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS WOULD NOW PROCEED TO GIVE THEIR VIEWS ON THE REMAINING ISSUES.

49. US REP SAID ALLIED REPS HAD HAD EVERY INTENTION OF ABIDING BY THE UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE PARALLEL DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES. THEY HAD HAD NO INTENTION TO CUT THE DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES SHORT. THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTINUE THE SESSION IN THE AFTERNOON TO PERMIT EASTERN REPS TO VIEW THE LAUNCHING OF THE SOVIET SPACE ROCKET IN THE INTERIM IF THE WESTERN REPS DESIRED THIS. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO CONTINUE.

50. POLISH REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE THE EAST'S VIEW OF THE PRESENT ROUND WHICH WAS ABOUT TO CONCLUDE: IN ATTEMPTING TO SUM UP THE RESULTS OF THIS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ONE WAS OBLIGED TO SAY THAT, THIS TIME TOO, NO SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS HAD BEEN ATTAINED. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED IT JUSTIFIABLE TO RESTATE WHAT THEY

HAD SAID SEVERAL TIMES ON THIS ISSUE: THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SITUATION WAS TO BE FOUND IN THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE WESTERN STATES IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. AS LONG AGO AS NOVEMBER 1973, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD PROPOSED A SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS AIMED AT CHANGING THE CORRELATION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN FAVOR OF NATO AND AS SUCH CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE. SINCE THAT TIME, WESTERN REPS HAD MAINTAINED THIS UNREALISTIC POSITION EVEN THOUGH THEY MUST BY NOW BE FULLY AWARE THAT IT COULD NOT BECOME THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

51. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, IN ADDITION TO THEIR BASIC POSITION SET FORTH IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973, EASTERN REPS HAD UNDERTAKEN A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES
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WHICH REMAINED VALID. BUT FOR THEIR PART, WESTERN REPS HAD NOT SHOWN ANY READINESS TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. IT WAS OF CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE THAT, DURING THE LAST THREE CONSECUTIVE ROUNDS, WESTERN REPS HAD ADVANCED NO NEW PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AS THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD DONE WITH REGARD TO THE WESTERN POSITION. MOREOVER, WESTERN REPS PERSISTED IN TAKING A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS ALL PROPOSALS OF EASTERN COUNTRIES DESIGNED TO OVERCOME THE STANDSTILL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO MOVE THEM TOWARDS SOLUTION.

52. POLISH REP SAID THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO DRAWN WESTERN ATTENTION TO CERTAIN FACTS WHICH COULD NOT FAIL TO PUT THE EAST ON GUARD. THESE WERE THE MEASURES BEING UNDERTAKEN TO STRENGTHEN NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. TWO US BRIGADES WITH SPECIAL MISSION, THREE FRG BRIGADES WITH SPECIAL MISSION AND AN ADDITIONAL DIVISION OF THE BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. EASTERN REPS COULD NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS WERE TAKING PLACE WHILE THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WERE GOING ON. EASTERN REPS WERE NOT CONVINCED BY THE CONTENTION THAT THESE ACTIVITIES WERE ONLY NORMAL FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS. EASTERN REPS COULD NOT OVERLOOK THE TIMING OF THESE MOVES, COMING AT A TIME WHEN EUROPE WAS ON THE VERGE OF RESTRUCTURING THE INTERSTATE RELATIONSHIP THROUGH THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.

53. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS COULD LEGITIMATELY ASK WHY THE WEST WAS TAKING SUCH STEPS AT SUCH A TIME. EASTERN REPS HAD

ALREADY CLEARLY INDICATED THAT, BY ANY OBJECTIVE STANDARD, THESE STEPS
WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO A SITUATION FAVORABLE TO THE SEARCH FOR
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. DURING
THE PRESENT ROUND, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ONCE AGAIN DISCUSSED IN
DETAIL THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND
ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM
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THE OUTSET, AND WHAT KIND OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE COVERED
BY REDUCTIONS. THROUGH THOROUGH EASTERN ANALYSIS, AS WELL AS THROUGH
COMPARISON OF THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF EAST AND WEST, EASTERN
REPS HAD ONCE MORE CONCLUSIVELY DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WAS THE WEST'S
POSITION WHICH CONSTITUTED THE OBSTACLE TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTIONS.

54. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES
SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THE EASTERN POSITION WAS CLEAR AND
LOGICAL. THIS POSITION WAS CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
AND ALSO WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF REDUCTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED BY
PARTICIPANTS. THE EASTERN POSITION HAD BEEN FULLY PRESENTED IN THE
EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973. THIS DRAFT AGREEMENT
CLEARLY STATED WHAT OBLIGATIONS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY EACH DIRECT
PARTICIPANT, NATURALLY ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE EASTERN POSITION AS SET FORTH IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WAS JUSTIFIED
AND WELL FOUNDED, EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO EXPRESSED READINESS TO INTRO-
DUCE AMENDMENTS IN IT DESIGNED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IMPORTANT ELEMENTS

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

OF THE WESTERN POSITION. THESE ACTIONS CLEARLY PROVED THE EASTERN
DESIRE TO BRING THE POSITIONS TOGETHER AND HAD SHOWN A POSSIBLE WAY T
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DO THIS. AS TO THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS QUESTION OF WHOSE
FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING,
IT HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED IN A WAY DESIGNED TO SECURE UNILATERAL
ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST. THE WESTERN POSITION WAS IN OPEN CONTRA-
DICTION OF THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF REDUCTIONS, UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY AND MUTUALITY. INDEED, IT WOULD SEEM UNTHINKABLE
THAT, HAVING COME TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS,
THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT EVEN READY TO DECLARE
WHAT OBLIGATIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
THEY WERE READY TO UNDERTAKE. BUT THIS WAS NONETHELESS THE WESTERN
POSITION. MOREOVER, AS HAD BECOME EVEN CLEARER IN THE PRESENT
ROUND, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS MADE PRIOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SO-CALLED
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COMMON CEILING A PRECONDITION FOR UNDERTAKING SPECIFIC REDUCTION
OBLIGATIONS. THERE HAD BEEN AN EVIDENT HARDENING ON THE WESTERN
POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT, AS SHOWN IN THE WESTERN RELUCTANCE EVEN
TO INDICATE THE CHARACTER OF THEIR REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS IN THE
SECOND PHASE OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. THIS WESTERN ATTITUDE COULD
NOT FAIL TO GIVE RISE TO THE MOST SERIOUS DOUBTS. THE WESTERN
POSITION ON THIS QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM
THE OUTSET DID NOT PROVIDE ANY BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION. IF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE MOTIVATED
BY THE DESIRE TO REACH AGREEMENT IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, THEY
MUST REALIZE THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO CONTAIN CLEAR OBLIGATION
S
BY EACH PARTICIPATING STATE ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES

AND ARMAMENTS. SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE REDUCTION PROCESS GOT UNDERWAY.

55. POLISH REP SAID THAT, TURNING TO THE SECOND QUESTION, WHAT KIND OF FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED, EASTERN REPS HAD FREQUENTLY EXPLAINED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION, BASED ON REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ONLY, PLUS SOVIET TANKS, WAS ANOTHER SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT. THIS POSITION TOO WAS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS FORMULA WAS THE NAVY. NO ONE COULD DENY THAT REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TOGETHER WITH GROUND FORCES ARMAMENTS, WAS NECESSARY

IF PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BE A REAL AND EFFECTIVE STEP TOWARDS STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE

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THE EXCLUSION FROM REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCES, NUCLEAR FORCES, AND GROUND FORCES ARMAMENTS DID LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONTINUED ARMS RACE, INCLUDING IN THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS. IF, AS WESTERN REPS SEEMED TO BE SAYING, WESTERN STATES DID NOT REALLY INTEND TO LEAVE AN OPENING FOR THEMSELVES TO INCREASE AIR FORCES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL, THEY SHOULD RELINQUISH THEIR OPPOSITION TO REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR AND OTHER ARMAMENTS, AND AGREE TO INCLUSION OF PROVISIONS COVERING THIS SUBJECT IN AN AGREEMENT.

56. POLISH REP SAID THESE POINTS CONFIRMED AND JUSTIFIED EASTERN
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ARGUMENTS THAT THE PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS W
AS

NOW WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD IN THE FIRST PLACE CHANGE THEIR POSITION SO THAT IT WOULD CONFORM TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES AND AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THEIR CONCRETE INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THEIR INITIATIVE TAKEN IN THE PRESENT ROUND ON THE ISSUE OF DEFINITIONS, THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAD SHOWN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES, IT WAS NOW THE TURN OF THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES, WHO HAD SO FAR NOT DEMONSTRATED SUCH READINESS. WHEN PARTICIPANTS RECONVENED IN VIENNA, IT WOULD BE ALMOST TWO YEARS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ONE COULD SAFELY ASSUME THAT, BY THIS TIME, PARTICIPANTS WERE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES. HE HOPED TOO THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THA
T

AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND NOT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE EASTERN COUNTRIES REMAINED READY TO

SEEK SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAD ATTACHED, AND CONTINUED TO ATTACH, GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE ATTENTION OF ALL STATES AND OF PUBLIC OPINION TO THE VIENNA TALKS AND TO THEIR EARLY SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION WOULD NOW BE GROWING. THIS CIRCUMSTANCE ADDED TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO JOINTLY WORK OUT SOLUTIONS OF A TYPE WHICH WOULD SUPPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE WITH MILITARY DETENTE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF ALL COUNTRIES AND NATIONS.

57. FRG REP SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT THE WESTERN ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, FRG REP SAID:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1147

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

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USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

THAT, WITH REGARD TO THE SUMMING UP ON THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, HE DID NOT THINK THAT IT WAS NECESSARY AT THIS POINT TO GO INTO DETAIL. HE SAID HE WOULD ONLY LIKE TO

LEAVE FIVE MAIN POINTS WITH EASTERN REPS ON WHICH THE JOINT DISCUSSION HAD FOCUSED DURING THE CURRENT ROUND. THOSE POINTS WERE, FIRST, THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND REDUCING THE RISK OF CONFLICT IN THE AREA WAS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES. THIS IN ALLIED REPS' MIND WAS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE KEY TO AGREEMENTS INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. SECOND, THAT THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH CONTAINED THE FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE THE WEST TO ABANDON ITS OPTION TO MAKE GOOD DISPARITIES NOT ONLY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, BUT RIGHT ACROSS THE MILITARY SPECTRUM, AND TO CONTRACTUALIZE
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THESE DISPARITIES. THE ALLIES WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WHICH HAD THIS EFFECT. THIRD, THAT THE LIMITATIONS ARISING OUT OF AN AGREEMENT CREATED AN ADVANTAGE FOR THE EASTERN SIDE WHICH WAS A FURTHER REASON FOR LARGER EASTERN REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT, AFTER AN AGREEMENT, ALL FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED AND LIMITED, BUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO LIMITATION ON THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE VERY LARGE SOVIET ARMED FORCES STATIONED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR WHICH WAS DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. FOURTH, THAT THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH CONTAINED THE DEFECT THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE THE WEST TO SUBSCRIBE TO INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL LIMITATIONS. EASTERN REPS WERE AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR WHICH THE ALLIES COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH AN OUTCOME. FIFTH, THAT THE EAST CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS AS TO THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE, DESPITE THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE HAND AND THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER HAND.

58. FRG REP SAID WESTERN REPS HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED THUS FAR BY THE FACT THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT HAD MORE SERIOUS JOINT DISCUSSION OF THESE POINTS. THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE CARDINAL ASPECTS OF THE ALLIED APPROACH AND BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO COME TO TERMS OVER THEM SOONER OR LATER IF THERE WAS TO BE AN AGREEMENT. EASTERN REPS HAD DEVELOPED VARIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST THESE POINTS. WESTERN REPS WERE FAMILIAR WITH THESE ARGUMENTS. THEY HAD NOT SHAKEN WESTERN REPS'S CONVICTION REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE POINTS. ALLIED REPS THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY THAT IT BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE WEST'S DETERMINED ADHERENCE TO THESE POINTS BELONGED TO THE CENTRAL POLITICAL REALITIES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS POSSIBLE, EASTERN REPS SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE

REALITIES AND DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSION FROM THEM.

59. OHE SESSION WAS CONCLUDED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE DATE FOR THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION SHOULD BE SET FOLLOWING RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 22ND.RESOR

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